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Abstrakt
Tato pra´ce se zaby´va´ prˇestaven´ım 3D tiska´rny na prˇ´ıstroj umozˇnˇuj´ıc´ı auto-
maticky sn´ımat elektromagneticky´ postrann´ı kana´l vycha´zej´ıc´ı z mikropro-
cesoru (cˇipove´ karty). C´ılem je na prˇ´ıstroji signa´l pomoc´ı digita´ln´ıho os-
ciloskopu nameˇrˇit a sestavit 3D graf, ktery´ bude zobrazovat mnozˇstv´ı vyza´rˇene´-
ho signa´lu v jednotlivy´ch mı´stech mikroprocesoru. Litera´rn´ı resˇersˇe se zaby´va´
elektromagneticky´m postrann´ım kana´lem a zp˚usoby analy´zy nameˇrˇeny´ch dat,
zejme´na pak diferencia´ln´ı elektromagnetickou analy´zou. Prakticka´ cˇa´st pra´ce
navazuje sestaven´ım prˇ´ıstroje na automatizovane´ meˇrˇen´ı, da´le pak programem,
ktery´ rˇesˇ´ı komunikaci mezi pocˇ´ıtacˇem, osciloskopem, pozicovac´ım prˇ´ıstrojem
a cˇipovou kartou. Za´veˇrecˇna´ cˇa´st pra´ce je veˇnova´na analy´ze a desˇifrova´n´ı
nameˇrˇeny´ch dat. Vy´sledek pra´ce nab´ız´ı levnou alternativu pro jizˇ existuj´ıc´ı
drahe´ prˇ´ıstroje meˇrˇ´ıc´ı postrann´ı elektromagneticke´ za´rˇen´ı.
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova Postrann´ı kana´ly, elektromagneticke´ za´rˇen´ı, diferencia´ln´ı elek-
tromagneticka´ analy´za, 3D tiska´rna, bl´ızke´ pole, smart card, AES
ix
Abstract
This thesis describes rebuilding a 3D printer into a device that automatically
captures electromagnetic side channel of a microprocessor (smart card). The
aim is to measure the signal emitted by a smart card using a digital oscilloscope
and to plot a 3D graph displaying the amount of signal radiated by each part of
the smart card. The theoretical part of this paper deals with electromagnetic
side channel and methods of analysis of measured data, particularly with
differential electromagnetic analysis. The practical part of the paper follows
with building a positioning device for automated measurements, then with a
program that handles communication between a computer, the oscilloscope,
the positioning device and the smart card. Finally, the program analyses the
measured data. The resulting device offers a cheap alternative to already
existing expensive devices measuring electromagnetic emissions.
Keywords Side channels, electromagnetic emission, differential electromag-
netic analysis, 3D printer, near field, smart card, AES
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Introduction
The development of computer and communication systems is getting faster
and with this development new attacks are created. Using more sophisticated
attacks means higher demands on cryptographic systems. Cryptanalysis fo-
cused on mathematical attacks can seem inefficient these days. Novel types
of cryptanalysis are created. Attacks which deal with side channels and are
focused on implementation of an algorithm or a protocol can be an example
of this kind of attack. They do not primarily try to find a weakness in an
algorithm, but they tend to misuse any information they can get from the
encrypting device.
This paper deals with electromagnetic side channel. Various parts of cryp-
tographic modules emit different amounts of electromagnetic emission. The
aim is to build a positioning device that can automatically measure electro-
magnetic radiation and process measured data. We will measure the signal in
different positions with respect to a smart card’s chip.
In the theoretical part, we will focus on a description of the side channels,
especially electromagnetic side channel. Then we will describe attacks using
electromagnetic side channels, such as simple electromagnetic analysis or dif-
ferential electromagnetic analysis. We will talk about ciphers and encryption
with the emphasis on AES cipher. Then we will describe devices used for
building our working environment and for the practical part of the thesis.
In the practical part, firstly we will focus on the realisation of the work-
ing environment. Then we will implement a program that can communicate
with devices used in the working environment, position a probe, save signal
measured by an oscilloscope and that can process measured data. Finally,
we will test this program and measure electromagnetic radiation in different
positions, process data, try to calculate correct cipher key using differential
electromagnetic analysis and make graphs out of the results.
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Chapter 1
Ciphers and Attacks
Codes and ciphers have been used for a few thousand years now to disguise the
meaning of secret messages, from the simplest ciphers of ancient times to the
modern encryption methods used today. Nowadays, ciphers are a necessary
part of computer’s communication. New ciphers are made to ensure that an
attacker cannot eavesdrop on someone’s conversation or steal someone’s data.
These ciphers are built to be mathematically almost impossible to break, or
it would take such a long time to reveal them, and it would not be relevant
for an attacker anymore.
1.1 Side-Channels
Cryptanalysis of side-channels is a relatively recent type of attack. These
types of attacks are focused on implementation of the cipher rather than its
mathematical principle. This characteristic makes them applicable even to
ciphers that are almost impossible to break mathematically.
In an ideal world, information gets to a device, it is processed and the
output is generated without any information leakage. To guarantee there is
no side channel leakage, this device would have to draw constant current,
have perfect electromagnetic screening shield etc. We can consider each un-
desirable type of communication as a side-channel. In real-world applications,
every cryptographic module consumes power and emits electromagnetic or
heat radiation depending on processed data. These channels can reveal sens-
itive data to the outside world.
Types of side-channels:
1. Power consumption
2. Timing
3
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3. Electromagnetic radiation
4. Optical
5. Fault
6. Acoustic channel
1.1.1 Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures
Side-channel attacks can be both invasive and non-invasive. When conducting
an invasive attack, an attacker needs to manipulate physically with a device
they want to attack. Most of the side-channel attacks are non-invasive, they
do not leave tracks, and they do not destroy or damage any data or system.
We do not have to be in possession of the device, and the victim might not
know we are attacking their system.
History
Military organisations were the first who used side-channel attacks. They
created TEMPEST standards [6], [7], [8] which determine required computer
protection against these attacks but also deal with attacking other systems.
Some of these standards were later revealed to the public.
In the public area, a scientist from the Netherlands, van Eck, was the first
to describe and conduct this attack [9]. He managed to measure the size of the
radiation of computer monitors and extracted original image from this data.
Scientists Kuhl and Anderson followed up with him and built a special cling
film which protected the screen from the attack. Agrawal, Archambeault, Rao
and Rohatgi followed on TEMPEST in their book [10], where they managed to
prove that electromagnetic side-channel attacks are realisable and sometimes
have better results than until that time used power side-channel attacks.
Description of an attack
As we can see in picture 1.1, plaintext comes to the cryptosystem and is en-
crypted with a cipher, during the encryption there is an information leakage
caused by side-channels.
The advantage of these types of attacks is that most of the devices are not
prepared for side-channel attacks. Nowadays, countermeasures are starting
to take place. One of the possibilities is to add unrelated operations during
encryption or decryption; this can help mostly against power and electromag-
netic side-channel attacks. It will add noise to consumption or electromagnetic
emissions and make it harder for an attacker to distinguish noise from a signal
caused by encrypting or decrypting operations. Another protection against
4
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CryptosystemPlaintext Ciphertext
Side channels
Attacker
Figure 1.1: Side-channels
electromagnetic side-channel is an electromagnetic shield, which is nowadays
commonly used to protect payment cards. There are more types of protec-
tions, but these are the most prevalent.
1.1.2 Electromagnetic Side-Channel
This section describes electromagnetic side-channel; more information can be
found at [11]. Electromagnetic side-channel attack is based on power con-
sumption side-channel attack. It is subject to the law of electromagnetic field,
which was created by James Clerk Maxwell, and its four fundamental math-
ematical equations [12]. Based on his laws, we can say that each change of
power or voltage causes a change of electromagnetic field. We can describe
this realationship using Lenz’s law [13]. This law is based on the one of the
Maxwell’s laws, Faraday law.
E = ∂δσ
∂δt
(Lenz’s Law) (1.1)
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At Equation 1.1, E stands for electromotive force and δ represents mag-
netic flux. It describes the relationship between the change of electromagnetic
field and the change of power or voltage.
The crucial difference between power and electromagnetic side-channel is
that power consumption is a simple amplitude waveform over time, while the
electromagnetic emission is a three-dimensional vector field that changes over
time. To describe it, we need to use vector calculus techniques.
Electromagnetic emissions can be both intentional and unintentional. For
example, an antenna emits electromagnetic emissions intentionally. All RFID
enabled cards have an antenna connected to their chip for communication with
the outside world. Another example can be a crystal oscillator defining the ex-
act frequency of an internal clock. Power consumption of circuit elements can
cause unintentional electromagnetic emissions. Through the Maxwell laws,
the electromagnetic field exists around them. Unintentional electromagnetic
emissions can be then used to attack the device.
We can use electric or magnetic probes to measure the electromagnetic
field. Small probes can be used to measure near-field, the closer to the source,
the more accurate the results are. When measuring near-field, the maximal
distance should be the wavelength from the source.
1.1.2.1 Electromagnetic zones
The behaviour of small electromagnetic sources or antennas can be simplified
and divided into two approximations: near field and far field. Consider a si-
nusoidal signal f going from point A to point B, where the distance between
these two points is r. The signal travelling in a medium with relative dielec-
tric constant r and relative permeability µr propagates with speed v = c√rµr ,
where c is a constant, which represents speed of electromagnetic waves in va-
cuum, of value 2.998 · 108 m/s. We can speak about a “small” distance if at
time t = kv , where t is time needed for a variation at point A to travel to point
B, the same variation can still be at point A. This is true, when t  T = 1f .
In practice, we do not need to measure the time, we can use the wavelength
λ, because λf = v, we can say that r  λ.
Near field is then defined as follows
kr  1 or r  λ2pi (near field)
r  λ2pi or kr  1 (far field)
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The electromagnetic signal in near field has high current and low voltage.
The source is mainly magnetic. Nature of the wave depends on the source’s
characteristics, while the wave measured in far-field depends on the propaga-
tion medium. Electric and magnetic fields are both planar waves. To see the
border between near field and far field, it is necessary to know the wavelength
distance λ. At a wavelength distance away from the source, the impedance of
all waves approaches the impedance of the free space, which is 377 Ω.
λ/2π
Electromagnetic 
Energy Source
Transition Region
Near field
Far field
Figure 1.2: Electromagnetic zones
1.1.2.2 Electromagnetic exploitation
There are more approaches to exploiting electromagnetic emission. [11]
1. Direct Local Radiation
This approach is technically the most difficult of the presented ap-
proaches. The amplitude is minimal and therefore a sensitive sensor is
needed. Its best use is for measuring magnetic field when rapid changes
in the current consumption generate the field.
2. Modulated Signals
Signals can become modulated on top of stronger carriers. The modu-
lated signals are measurable at a larger distance.
7
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3. Remote Electromagnetic Analysis
There are two types of this approach. First one is near-field, which we
will use in this paper to measure electromagnetic emission. The second
one is far-field.
4. Remote Power Analysis
This approach is the same as electromagnetic analysis, but instead of
the radiation originating from the power consumption on the chip, the
field to power up RFID cards is analysed.
1.2 AES
AES stands for Advanced Encryption Standard. FIPS 197 [14] fully describes
this cipher. It is a symmetric block cipher, i.e. it is using the same key for
encrypting and decrypting, and it divides the plaintext into blocks of a given
length, precisely 128 bits.
It is considered to be a secure cipher and a standard for encrypting inform-
ation. It is commonly used for data encryption. The only successful attack
at this cipher was a side-channel attack. It substituted previously used DES
cipher that is less secure. Appendix A consists of a description of this cipher.
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Chapter 2
Electromagnetic Analysis
Analysis of a side-channel can be both invasive and non-invasive. An electro-
magnetic analysis is typically non-invasive attack. Attacks are conducted to
detect sensitive data from victim device.
Oscilloscope
Cryptosystem
(target device)
Side-channel
Key related information leakage
Ciphertext
Plaintext
Figure 2.1: Electromagnetic analysis
As you can see in Figure 2.1, typical setup consists of a target device,
where ciphers like DES or AES can be implemented, an oscilloscope and a
computational platform.
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Plaintext is sent to the target device, where encryption takes place, and
ciphertext goes out of the device. While encrypting data, the oscilloscope
measures electromagnetic radiation via probes, and the resulting measure-
ments are sent to the computational platform, where an attacker can take an
advantage of them.
There are two basic types of electromagnetic analysis: Simple electromag-
netic analysis and Differential electromagnetic analysis.
2.1 Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA)
Simple electromagnetic analysis requires just one measurement or only a few
of them. It is very similar to simple power analysis (SPA), described in [15].
It makes use of a relation between an instruction that is being executed and
information which is gathered from an electromagnetic side-channel. It is,
therefore, a direct data processing. An attacker is directly dealing with elec-
tromagnetic radiation and its changes in an attacked device at a specific time.
It is essential to have detailed knowledge of the algorithm implemented on
the victim’s machine and to have knowledge about the cryptographic device
itself. It is also crucial to have a strong relationship between electromagnetic
radiation and the value of the secret key.
Unlike simple or differential power analysis, which can measure power con-
sumption by measuring ends of a power source, SEMA needs a special probe
(antenna) for precise measurements.
There are two types of simple electromagnetic analysis. First one is single-
shot SEMA, which needs only one measurement. The second one is multiple-
shot SEMA; this type requires more measurements than just one. Multiple
measurements can eliminate some unwanted noise. We can measure electro-
magnetic radiation for either the same plaintext each time or a different one.
2.2 Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA)
DEMA is very similar to DPA (Differential Power Analysis), which is de-
scribed in [15]. In contrary to SEMA, DEMA needs a lot of measurements.
The number of measurements ranges in thousands. Since there are more meas-
urements taken, there is a higher possibility to reduce noise and some wrong
values from the measured data. Compared to SEMA, DEMA is much more
efficient. There is also no need for detailed knowledge of the cryptographic
10
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system and the implemented algorithm as it was in SEMA.
Data processing is different as well. In SEMA, measured data were pro-
cessed directly at a specific time to find a template or a pattern. DEMA does
not need any waveform at a specific timeline; it leverages a relation between
constant time and processed value. Another advantage of DEMA is that it
guesses a small part of a secret key at a time. For instance, DEMA can guess
a single byte at a time, which makes it possible to try all the values of the
key. It only tries 28 possible values for each byte of the key. Taking 16-byte
key, the algorithm has to try 16 · 28 = 212 possibilities instead of 2128. The
whole diagram of DEMA can bee seen in Figure 2.2.
There are five steps in DEMA:
1. Choose intermediate result.
2. Measure electromagnetic field.
3. Calculate the hypothetical intermediate result.
4. Map hypothetical intermediate results to measured data.
5. Compare hypothetical values to measured data.
Used abbreviations
• f (d,k) . . . hypothesis function for calculating intermediate result
• D . . . number of input data blocks, number of measurements
• d . . . vector with input data for one measurement (one trace)
• T . . . length of the trace
• T . . . matrix of size D×T, measured traces
• k . . . key candidate
• k . . . vector with all the possible keys, key hypotheses
• K . . . total number of possible key choices
• V . . . matrix of size D×K, intermediate result
• vi,n . . . element of matrix V
• vck . . . vector, values for the right cipher key
• kck . . . secret key
11
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• H . . . matrix of hypothetical values of electromagnetic emissions
• R . . . matrix of size KxT, comparision between H and T
• ct . . . index of measured data that are dependent on intermediate result
• ck . . . index of the right cipher key
• i . . . index of input data, 1,. . . , D
• j . . . index of traces, 1,. . . , T
• n . . . index of key candidates, 1,. . . , K
2.2.1 Choose Intermediate Result
Intermediate value is chosen according to the hypothesis function f (d, k),
where d is (in most cases) a plaintext or a ciphertext sent to the device and k
is a subkey. Hypothesis f is determined by the encryption algorithm as well;
it is a specific function of the implemented algorithm. It must be a function
of known variable d and a small part of a key k. According to that, one part
is known and the other one can be guessed.
We need the intermediate value for estimation of the correlation between
electromagnetic emission and the internal data or operations performed during
the computation of the cipher. For example, we can assume that the interme-
diate value with more bits set to 1 will emit more electromagnetic signal. We
will use the intermediate result to decide whether the correlation exists or not
in subsection 2.2.6.
2.2.2 Measure Electromagnetic Field
Second step is to measure electromagnetic field of cryptographic device when
encrypting or decrypting various data D. An attacker needs to know vector
(or they can choose it) d, where d = (d1, . . . , dD)’ with input data for each
measurement. Measurements of electromagnetic field (ti,1, ..., ti,T ) correspond
with data di. We conduct a measurement for each of the D data blocks. Data
must be assigned to its measurement and saved. They are used in the first
step to compute the intermediate result.
The result of the measurement is a matrix T of size D×T. For each input,
we save the same part of the measurement. The same operation must corres-
pond to each column tj . The best way to obtain this is to use a trigger signal
to record the electromagnetic emissions of the same sequence of operations for
each encryption or decryption run.
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2.2.3 Calculate the Hypothetical Intermediate Results
In this step, hypothetical intermediate results are calculated for each pos-
sibility of chosen part of the key k = (k1, . . . , kK), where k1, . . . , kK are
hypothetical values of the key and K is the maximum number of hypothetical
keys. Intermediate value f(d, k) is calculated for all D encrypting or decrypt-
ing operations and all K key hypotheses. The result is a matrix V of size
D×K.
vi,n = f(di, kn) (2.1)
Each column of matrix V consists of results computed from the hypothesis
of key kj , which also means the correct cipher key used in the device. The
goal is to find the column with values which were processed during encrypt-
ing or decrypting operations in the device. When we find this column, we
immediately know the secret key kck.
2.2.4 Map Intermediate Results to Hypothetical Values of
Electromagnetic Emissions
Hypothetical intermediate values from matrix V are mapped to hypothet-
ical electromagnetic emissions in matrix H. The electromagnetic emission is
estimated according to a defined model for each value vi,n in order to ob-
tain a hypothetical electromagnetic emission value hi,n. Accuracy depends on
the attacker’s knowledge of the device. Hamming weight is a commonly used
model; it is the easiest way, and the attacker does not need to have any further
knowledge about the inner structure of the device.
2.2.5 Compare Hypothetical Values to Measured Data
Result of this step is a matrix R of size K×T, where each element rn,j is a
result of comparison between each column hn and tj . Determination of the
key takes advantage of the fact that electromagnetic waveforms correspond to
the electromagnetic emissions in the device during encryption or decryption
for different input data. Intermediate result chosen in the first step must be a
part of the algorithm. As a result of that, some parts in a specific time are de-
pendent on intermediate result. This part of the measured data can be called
ct. Tct consists of electromagnetic emission, which depends on intermediate
result vck.
Hypothetical values hck were estimated based on vck values. Columns hck
and tct are strongly dependent on each other. They are leading to the highest
absolute value in the matrix R. The highest value of R is kck,ct. Other values
are lower because they are not that much dependent on each other. Index for
the right key is the highest value ck and the highest value of time moment ct.
Indexes of these two values are the results of DEMA.
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2.2.6 Attack Based on Correlation Coefficient
Pearson correlation coefficient is commonly used to establish a linear depend-
ency between two random variables. Correlation is defined for two quantities
X and Y using covariation by the relation:
ρ = Cov(X,Y )√
σ2(X)σ2(Y )
. (2.2)
Covariation Cov(x,y) is the expected value of the product of deviations of
the random variables from their individual expected values.
cov(X,Y ) = E[(X − E[X])(Y − E[Y ])], (2.3)
where sigma is the standard deviation of the random variable. The values
of the correlation coefficient range from -1 to 1. The value of 1 implies that
there is a linear relationship between X and Y. A 0 value implies that there
is no linear correlation between these two variables and -1 value implies that
there is inverse linear relationship.
Usually, we do not know the precise distributions of X and Y, because we
can perform a limited amount of measurement. If we have a sample of values
of X and Y, we can compute the sample correlation coefficient:
r =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2
(2.4)
Equation according to DEMA matrixes:
ri,j =
D∑
i′=1
(hi′,i − h¯i)(ti′,j − t¯j)√√√√ D∑
i′=1
(hi′,i − h¯i)2
D∑
i′=1
(ti′,j − t¯j)2
(2.5)
The correlation coefficient is not the only way of comparing data. The
difference or the distance of means can be also used. When the attacker has
better knowledge of the device, they can use a template-based attack. For
more information on template attacks, see for example [15], but in subsequent
text, we will use the Pearson correlation coefficient only.
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2.3 DEMA on AES
The main step in the differential electromagnetic analysis is to select a hypo-
thesis f. Selection differs according to an encryption algorithm, but it must
be a function of a known variable d and a secret key k. In this paper, we
will use output of function AddRoundKey() in the initialisation part of the
algorithm, which is the input for the substitution table S-Box. The function
is called SubBytes() transformation, which is a non-linear byte substitution
that operates independently with S-Box, see Appendix A.
vi,n = f(di, kn) = SBox(PTi,m ⊕ kn), (2.6)
where di = PTi,m is the mth byte of the ith block of the plain text PT, and
kn is a hypothetical key that guesses the value of the right key byte Km.
It does not matter which output bit of S-Box output is used as a function
f ; it always corresponds not only to the bit in PTi,m or Kn, but also to the
changes of other input bits. This ensures relative independence of f values
calculated using right and wrong key. Because of that, it reduces correlation
between the measured data and the predicted values calculated based on the
wrong key. This makes it easier to identify the right key. [16]
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Figure 2.2: Differential electromagnetical analysis
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Chapter 3
Near-Field Cartography
Near-field cartography is essential for finding the hot spot of a measured
device. An electromagnetic probe is small compared to the measured device;
it is necessary to find the place with the highest signal. It can be done by
manual search, where we can look for the highest value of the electromagnetic
emission, but it is neither the smartest nor the most efficient solution.
The best way to do that is to build a device, which will move the probe
automatically. We can use more techniques to do that. There are several pa-
pers employing a positioning device for moving probe and measuring electro-
magnetic emissions. However, there is no further description of the equipment
used for holding and moving the probe during the measurement.
There are also more approaches how to decide the best place to attack.
This chapter is focused on these methods.
3.1 Indicators of the best spot to attack
Several techniques can be used to calculate the most interesting spots on a
measured device. The basic approaches how to get the best spot to attack are
described in [17].
The first approach is to take the maximum of each trace and to compare the
ratio between the noise and the interesting trace. It needs three measurements,
one for the encryption/decryption and two for the noise. Then the SNImax
(maximal difference indicator) is defined as:
SNImax =
MAXT0 (|ΓAES − Γnoise|)
MAXT0 (|Γnoise2 − Γnoise|)
(3.1)
ΓAES represents the measured signal where the source was AES and Γnoise2
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is measured noise.
The best place to attack is where SNImax has the highest value, due to
the increase of the signal level during the encryption/decryption. Instead of
SNImax, we can also use time-integrated indicator SNIt, which can repres-
ent the consumption of the encryption/decryption. SNIt can be calculated
according to this equation:
SNIt =
∫ T
0 (|ΓAES − Γnoise|)∫ T
0 (|Γnoise2 − Γnoise|)
(3.2)
However, the time-integrated indicator SNIt is less precise than SNImax.
The second approach is an S-Box maximal difference indicator. Firstly,
we must find a position, where the signal correlates with the AES S-Box the
most. This indicator tries to remove logical noise that is caused by the other
bits activity. Targeted logical object is the output of the S-Box i, where
0 ≤ i ≤ 16. The main source of the logical noise is assumed to be the other
S-Boxes activity. In this approach, we must choose a plaintext with a variable
part and a fixed part. Variable part stimulates the activity of the ith S-Box,
while the fixed part ensures that the activity of other S-Boxes is kept constant.
It also has two ways of calculating the best position to attack. First one is
MDImax, which is defined as:
MDimax =
MAXT0 (|ΓM1 − ΓM2|)
MAXT0 (|ΓM1′ − ΓM1|)
(3.3)
The second one is also the time-integrated way MDIt defined as:
MDIt =
∫ T
0 (|ΓM1 − ΓM2|)∫ T
0 (|ΓM1′ − ΓM1|)
(3.4)
In both equations, M1 and M2 are messages sent to a measured device.
MDI has better results than SNI according to [17]. Interesting areas are
smaller than in SNI, which makes MDI more precise. Unlike SNI, MDIt is
more precise than MDImax.
The third approach is a CEMA (correlation electromagnetic analysis) in-
dicator. CEMA is an improved DEMA 2.2 that takes noise into account and
therefore leads to a smaller number of measurements. The CEMA indicator
is linked to the number of messages needed to perform a CEMA. It can be
thousands of messages, and CEMA needs to be done on each point. This
makes it more time-consuming. Conducting this method can take a few days,
while MDI or SNI can take only a few minutes.
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Results can be calculated in two ways. First one calculates the minimum
number of messages that need to be sent to the device for computing the
right key using CEMA. The second way sends a fixed number of messages
and calculates the ratio of the maximum value of the CEMA peak of the right
key. The results of CEMA indicator are similar compared to MDI, but this
method takes longer time than MDI.
19

Chapter 4
Measuring Equipment
In this chapter, we will focus on the equipment we will need in the realisation
part of this paper. Schematic 4.1 shows our working environment and all
connections between devices.
Oscilloscope
Positioning device
Smart card reader
Probe
Figure 4.1: Working environment
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As we can see in Figure 4.1, we will need an oscilloscope that can commu-
nicate and get commands from a computer, a smart card, a card reader con-
nected to the computer, and a positioning device, which will position probes
attached to the oscilloscope.
4.1 Oscilloscope
An oscilloscope is an electronic test instrument. It displays the value of an
electric signal over time. We can find the amplitude of a signal on the Y-axis
and time along the X-axis. It is used for displaying the shape of a waveform,
measuring amplitude and frequency of a signal and for detecting glitches and
noise in a signal.
Most common types of the oscilloscope are an analogue and a digital os-
cilloscope. The main difference between these two types is that an analogue
oscilloscope shows waveform in the original form, whereas a digital oscillo-
scope reads a voltage on an input channel, amplifies the signal, conditions
the signal and converts the signal with an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADS)
into digital numbers and then stores them in digital format. ADS samples the
voltage into an n-bit sample taken every t seconds.
Figure 4.2: Oscilloscope
Essential parts and controls are a display that shows the current status of a
signal, graticule, analogue input channels, analogue probes, trigger control etc.
4.2. More information about how oscilloscopes work and what they consist of
can be found in [18].
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4.1.1 Communication With Oscilloscopes
Most oscilloscopes can communicate with a computer via USB or LAN inter-
face. An oscilloscope usually has a range of SCPI commands (Standard Com-
mands for Programmable Instruments). A computer can send these commands
to the oscilloscope, and the oscilloscope will send its response back. Program
for controlling oscilloscope can be written e.g. in C/C++ or Visual Basic. A
full description of commands and their usage for the used oscilloscope can be
found in [19].
4.2 Near-Field Probes
This section describes properties of antennas and probes. More information
about antennas and probes and how to find the best one for specific measure-
ments can be found in [11].
Probes are used to measure radiation efficiently. The probe is an essential
part of a measurement chain. According to [11], every probe has several
fundamental properties, e.g. radiation pattern, polarisation gain, impedance
and bandwidth.
• Sensitivity
Some probes are more sensitive towards electric or magnetic fields. Some
can be a combination of both.
• Receiving/Radiation Pattern
Receiving/radiation pattern is a spatial sensitivity of the sensor towards
electromagnetic fields. It defines suitability of a sensor for a specific task.
It is defined by the type or topology of the probe and corresponding
design parameters.
• Polarisation
Polarisation of a wave defines behaviour and orientation of the tip of the
total electric field vector in a fixed plane over time. The polarisation
of the probe corresponds to the polarisation of the wave transmitted or
received by the probe.
• Gain
Gain is defined as a maximum of the ratio of the radiated power per
unit of space as a function of (θ, φ), where θ and φ are two of the three
parameters from the spherical coordinate system, to the power fed to the
probe per unit of space. Losses in the probe are defined as a difference
between gain and directivity. Directivity is defined as a maximum of the
ratio between the radiated power per unit of space (θ, φ) and the mean
radiated power per unit of space.
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• Input Impedance
Input impedance influences the efficiency of energy transfer to and from
the probe.
• Bandwidth
Bandwidth is defined as a frequency range where the probe satisfies some
imposed specifications.
Shielded-Loop
Probes can have a shielded or a non-shielded loop. The difference can be
seen in Figure 4.3. The most important difference is a gap in the shield in a
shielded loop. The same as in an unshielded circuit, induced voltage at the
terminals is generated through the change in magnetic flux captured by the
loop. It behaves according to Faraday-Lenz law (Equation 1.1). The voltage
is induced over the slit at the outer surface of the conductor. The inner side
of the shield is electrically separated from the outer side of the shield. The
inner surface of the shield and inner conductor bring together transmission
line, which is driven by the induced voltage over the slit. The probe itself is
a shield. The current runs on the outer side of the shield. When the current
gets to the gap, it will return along the inside of the outer conductor, which
induces the current in the inner conductor.
Non-Shielded Loop Shielded Loop
Figure 4.3: Example of non-shielded and shielded probe
4.2.1 RF2 Near-Field Probe Set
In this paper, we will use probes from RF2 Near Field Probe Set [1]. Set
consists of four probes, which are all passive near-field probes. They can
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measure electric and magnetic fields from 30 MHz to 3 GHz. They all have a
current attenuating sheath and therefore are electrically shielded. They can
be connected to a spectrum analyser or an oscilloscope with a 50 Ω input.
• RF-R 400-1 4.4
This probe is highly sensitive. It is suitable for measurements up to 10
cm. It has a spatial field structure.
Figure 4.4: RF-R 400-1 measuring principles [1]
• RF-R 50-1 4.5
This probe covers less of the magnetic field due to its smaller diameter,
which is 10 mm. Therefore, it is less sensitive than RF-R 400-1, but it
has a higher resolution than RF-R 400-1. It is suitable for measurements
up to 3 cm.
Figure 4.5: RF-R 50-1 measuring principles [1]
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• RF-U 5-2 4.6
This probe is suitable for detecting magnetic fields at broad conducting
paths, cables, etc. The probe head can be put directly on the component.
Figure 4.6: RF-U 5-2 measuring principles [1]
• RF-B 3-2 4.7
The measurement coil of this probe is at 90◦ angle to the probe shaft.
It touches the surface of the printed circuit board directly. In contrast
to RF-U 5-2 probe, magnetic lines that enter the probe laterally are not
detected.
Figure 4.7: RF-B 3-2 measuring principles [1]
4.3 Positioning Device – 3D Printer
A technology used for 3D printing belongs to the category of CNC machines.
CNC machines are machines controlled by a numerical computer. There is a
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wide range of these machines. They can be used in agriculture, in manufactur-
ing and many other fields. An example of a CNC machine could be a milling
machine, a plasma cutter or a drill. These machines have preprogrammed
sequences of machine control commands and communicate only by listening
to these commands.
In this thesis, we will use 3D printing technology for positioning probes in
three-dimensional space. We will use the RepRap technology. It is currently
very popular type of an CNC machine. RepRap is a form of a free 3D printer.
It is a self-replicating machine and the first of the low-cost 3D printers. We
will work with a model called RebeliX, beacause it is easily accessible and it
was available for us. This model is inspired by Rebel II and Prusa i3. It is an
open-source project and a part of the RepRap project. The complete manual
on how to construct this 3D printer can be found in [2].
Figure 4.8: RebeliX 3D printer [2]
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4.4 Smart Card
A smart card is a plastic card that is used as a storage of information. It is
an authentication factor. Examples of smart cards include a payment card,
an electronic ticket, an entry card etc. Smart cards are defined in a standard
called ISO 7816. ISO 7816 does not determine the electronics, and a smart
card can have just a memory chip, or more likely nowadays, a microcontroller
and a memory chip.
The microcontroller of the smart card is either configured using a manufacturer-
supplied API of commands, or it can be programmed with a custom program
during manufacturing or in the field. They do not contain any battery; smart
card reader or writer supplies the power. Security measures include symmetric
authentication and encryption or asymmetric schemes.
We can divide cards into groups by API they use for communication. The
first group is contact smart cards. It means that we must insert the smart card
into a smart card reader or writer with a direct connection to a conductive
contact plate on the surface of the card.
Figure 4.9: Contact smart card
They can contain up to eight contact PINs, see Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: Contact smart card PINs [3]
The second group is contactless smart cards. Contactless smart cards
communicate using a radio frequency signal, with a typical range of less than
2 feet. Communication of contactless smart cards is based on technology
similar to Radio Frequency ID tags (RFID) used in stores to counter theft
and track inventory.
Figure 4.11: Contactless smart card [4]
The third group is a combination of the two previous groups. The first
one is a hybrid smart card which contains more than one chip inside. The
chips have no interface with each other. The second one is a dual interface
smart card. It is a combination of contact and contactless smart card using a
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single chip with both interfaces. It is mostly used in banking applications as
a payment card.
Figure 4.12: Dual smart card [3]
Cards can also be electrical, optical or based on the electromagnetic signal
[20].
In this thesis, we will work with an AVR card. This card contains AT-
Mega163 and 256K EEPROM, see Figure 4.13. It can be programmed in
C or Assembler. It is a contact card, nowadays mostly used for educational
purposes. It has no protection against side channel attacks.
4.4.1 Smart Card Programming
In this paper, we will use AVR Dragon programmer (Figure 4.14) for program-
ming smart cards. We can write a program e.g. in C and use AVR Studio for
uploading the program into the smart card.
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Figure 4.13: ATMega Card
Figure 4.14: AVR Dragon Programmer with custom smart card interface ad-
apter
4.4.2 Smart Card Reader
For communication with the smart card, we used ACR38U-I1 smartcard reader
from the company Advanced Card Systems Ltd. [21]. It supports smart cards
and microprocessor cards with protocols T=0 and T=1. This card reader is
considered to cause noise in electromagnetic field, so the measurements can
be influenced and distorted by using this reader. We chose to use this model
because it was readily available for our use.
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Chapter 5
Realisation of the Working
Environment
We can see the whole working environment in Figure 5.1. The working envir-
onment consists of a positioning device, a smart card and a smart card reader,
a probe, a holder of the probe, an amplifier, an oscilloscope and a computer.
This chapter describes the realisation of the working environment, rebuilding
a 3D printer into a positioning device, designing and printing holders for the
probes.
Figure 5.1: Working environment
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5.1 Positioning Device
We used 3D printing technology, specifically 3D printer RebeliX because we
have this technology at the faculty. It is a low-cost printer and it is easily
accessible. The printer frame was already built, we needed to connect stepper
motors and set the printer’s firmware.
We used Minitronics board, which claims to be a natural solution that fits
90% of the 3D printers. It has Atmega1281 processor with 128 KB memory,
running at 16 MHz. It can be connected to a computer via USB cable. The
board is compatible with Arduino. The schematic of the board can be seen in
Figure 5.2. The Minitronics in the picture is version 1.0; we used version 1.1.
There are only slight changes between these two versions. More information
about Minitronics, its properties and technical specification can be found in
Minitronics v1.1 Datasheet [22].
Figure 5.2: Schematic of Minitronics 1.0 [5]
We connected X, Y and Z stepper motors and endstops. We did not con-
nect extruder stepper motor or extruders, because we did not need them; we
have a measuring probe instead of an extruder. We also did not have to con-
nect a cooling fan, because we used DRV8825 stepper motor driver [23] that
does not need a cooling system for the used electric voltage (12 V). We needed
to connect a thermistor extruder. The board has three analogue inputs for
temperature (the schematic shows only two of them), one of which is used
for temperature control. However, we do not use an extruder; we decided
to connect a fixed resistor instead of the thermistor. The resistance of the
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resistor is 100 kΩ, which is the resistance of a commonly used thermistor type
at room temperature. It makes the printer usable even without an extruder
and a heated bed. After that, we connected the board to a power source and
a computer.
As a firmware we used Marlin-RC, which is an open-source 3D printer firm-
ware. We had to make a few changes in the firmware’s configuration because
we did not use a printhead. We made changes in the file Configuration.h.
We needed to double the default steps per unit because we used different step-
per motor driver. The default value was set to 16 micro steps, but the motor
stepstick DRV8825 support 32 micro steps. We also changed X MAX POSITION
from 200 to 190 in order to avoid crashing the X axis into a hard mechanical
limit. The length of the X axe should be 20 cm, but the length in this printer
is a little bit less.
After changing the firmware, we were able to program the Minitronics
board with Arduino using Marlin firmware.
5.2 Holders for Probes
To be able to mount probes to the positioning device, we needed to design and
print holders for the probes. We designed the holders in OpenSCAD, which is
an open source program for creating 3D objects. After that, we printed them
on another 3D printer that was configured for normal usage.
We needed to design and print two different holders according to the shapes
of probes (subsection 4.2.1) used for measurements. One holds a probe in a
horizontal position and the other in a vertical position. Figure 5.3 and Fig-
ure 5.4 show the design of the holders.
Holders can be modified and printed according to dimensions of the chosen
3D printer. Size of the holes for screws is parametrised, as well as the distance
between the holes.
After we finished the design, we exported the holders into STL format. We
used Slic3r to slice the model and generate commands for the printer. Then
we printed the holders using Pronterface on the 3D printer. We can see the
printed holders in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.3: Design of horizontal holder for probes 4.4, 4.5
Figure 5.4: Desing of vertical holder for probes 4.7
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Figure 5.5: Printed vertical holder for probes 4.7
Figure 5.6: Printed horizontal holder for probes 4.4, 4.5
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Chapter 6
Implementation of the attack
We will conduct an attack against a smart card in different positions with
respect to its chip. We need to communicate with the positioning device to
change locations. Then we need to send commands to an oscilloscope when it
should measure data, get measured data from the oscilloscope and save them
for future usage. We have to send a plaintext to the smart card and save the
received ciphertext using a smart card reader.
In each position, we will try to guess the key used by the smart card. We
will use differential electromagnetic analysis to do so. Finally, according to
the measured data and the success of DEMA, we will visualise the results in
graphs using Wolfram Mathematica.
We will implement the program in Visual Studio in C++. The program
will be running only on Windows due to usage of Windows-specific libraries
(Keysight IO Libraries Suite [24]). We can see the whole structure of the
program in schematic Figure 6.1.
6.1 Communication
As we wrote in the previous paragraph, the computer needs to communicate
with an oscilloscope, a smart card and a positioning device. Some parts of the
communication were already implemented and only slightly changed, some of
them were written from scratch. Communication with an oscilloscope and a
smart card was written by Petr Vyleta for use in laboratory exercises of the
Hardware Security course (MI-HWB).
6.1.1 Oscilloscope
Communication with oscilloscope was already written. Even though it was
written for a different oscilloscope (for Agilent DSO-X 3012A [19], we used
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Figure 6.1: Scheme of the implemented program
Agilent DSO 6104A [25]), the main methods for sending commands and sav-
ing measured data were functional. The class consists of methods for sending
commands, receiving messages and connecting to an oscilloscope. The only
methods that did not work with the used oscilloscope were methods for saving
and loading configuration of the oscilloscope.
The program uses VISA (Virtual Instrument Software Architecture) for
communicating with the oscilloscope. To use this program, you need to install
VISA and add it to the library path in Visual Studio.
6.1.2 Smart Card
Communication with a smart card was already written as well. It consists
of methods that connect a computer to the card, send plaintext to the card
and receive ciphertext from the card using APDU (Application Protocol Data
Unit).
The program uses PC/PS interface to communicate with the smart card.
Specifically, it uses WinSCard API. It communicates using protocol T=1,
which means it communicates in blocks.
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6.1.3 Positioning Device
The communication with the positioning device had to be implemented by
us. As we wrote in the previous chapters, we used 3D printer technology as
a positioning device, therefore the communication with the positioning device
is a communication with a 3D printer. The controlling software sends G-Code
commands (see Figure 6.2) to the printer to let the printer know where to
move. G-Code is a language used with CNC devices.
Figure 6.2: G-Code example
The printer uses serial communication for sending and receiving data. We
used class for serial communication written by Thierry Schneider.
We implemented a method for connecting a computer to the printer. In
the connection method, it is also necessary to do homing of the printer to know
future positions after moving and for the printer to know the boundaries where
to stop. Then we implemented two methods for positioning the probe. Both
methods need G-Code with specified positions where to move.
6.2 Positioning
Probes can be positioned and moved in three dimensions. In the program, we
can choose dimensions of the space which will be examined. The length can
be different along each axis. We can also set the size of the gap between each
measurement in a configuration file. We can see the diagram of the measured
area in Figure 6.3.
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6.3 DEMA Attack
We implemented differential electromagnetic attack in C++. The program
attacks bytes one by one. The program uses threads, one thread for each
byte; the number of the threads running at the same time can be specified in
a configuration file.
Before we attack the bytes, there is an initial part. DEMA takes initial
information such as the plaintext, the measured traces and the length of each
measured trace from files. The directory where the data is stored is also
specified in the configuration. In this part, data length which we will use in
DEMA (part of the measured data) and data start position are loaded from
the configuration file. These two parameters specify the part of the measured
data that we use for the attack. After that, plaintext and traces are loaded
from files.
After initial part, we attack the key bytes. We use output of function
AddRoundKey() as a place to attack. We use Hamming weight to model the
hypothetical values of electromagnetic emission. Finally, to get the right key,
we use the correlation of matrices with Hamming weight and measured traces.
The whole diagram describing the attack on one byte of the key can be seen
in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic of an attack on one byte
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6.3.1 Time Requirement
DEMA attack can take quite a long time, depending on the number of meas-
urements. The first prototype of this program was very slow; it used STL
containers, such as vector. After rewriting vectors to arrays, the program
got considerably faster. We tried to use libraries for faster computation with
matrices such as GSL, but the program got even slower. The next thing
that sped the program up was to change correlation calculation, which is the
most time-consuming part of the program. Instead of iterating one by one
and computing correlation for one value in one iteration, the program now
calculates the correlation for eight values in one iteration. This change sped
up the program about twice. Finally, we decided to use threads to make
the program faster. We use one thread for calculating one byte of the key.
DEMA is a computationally challenging problem, and it is not possible for
every computer to compute all sixteen bytes at once. Therefore, this para-
meter is configurable. The number of threads running at the same time can
be set in the configuration file.
6.4 Configuration File
Some parameters can be set in a configuration file.
• READER NUMBER - the number of the smart card connected to the com-
puter,
• NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS - the number of measurements for each posi-
tion,
• SPACES - the length of the space between measurements on axis X and
Y,
• Z SPACES - the length of the space between measurements on the Z axis,
• OUTPUT FOLDER - path to the output folder for measured data = input
folder for DEMA and graphs,
• PRINTER PORT,
• MEASURED DATA LENGTH - data length used for DEMA,
• DATA START POSITION - starting position of the data for calculating
DEMA,
• NUMBER OF THREADS - the number of threads running at the same time
in DEMA calculation,
• CIPHER KEY - used cipher key for AES encryption.
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6.5 Graphs
As we wrote in the previous section, most of the graphs were created using
Wolfram Mathematica. There are several ways how to establish the best place
to attack, as is described in chapter 3. We visualised graphs and the best spots
according to several factors.
The first approach was to compute absolute mean value of measurements
at each position, find the highest one and consider that to be the best spot
to attack. The second one was to get the best spot by counting bytes of the
key that the program guessed correctly. In the third approach, we calculated
the position of the correct key in the correlation matrix and visualised data
according to this factor. For the second and the third approach, it is necessary
to know the right cipher key used by the smart card.
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Chapter 7
Testing
This chapter describes how we tested the implemented program and presents
the results that we obtained during testing.
7.1 DEMA
First of all, we needed to program the smart card to encrypt using AES. We
used a program written by Matthias Bruestle using files from the Chair for
Embedded Security (EMSEC), Ruhr-University Bochum. AES implementa-
tion in this program was written by Jeff Tikkanen. The program was modified
by Filip Stepanek for smart card education at FIT-CTU. The program is writ-
ten in C, with small parts written in assembler. We programmed the smart
card using AVR Studio 4. During the programming, we could also choose our
key to know if the DEMA was successful.
In order to have better results when calculating DEMA, we need to know
which data part of the encryption we need to save. We are attacking the
initial part of the cipher; we need to cut the signal according to the part of
the encryption we want to attack. In this implementation, we dropped the
first 16000 samples of the traces, took the next 50000 samples and calculated
DEMA from these. The counts are parameters and can be set differently in
the configuration file. To know when the encryption starts, we need to detect
the trigger signal. In order to detect it, we used measuring adapter in Fig-
ure 7.1. This adapter allows us to detect when the encryption starts and save
traces accordingly. We put the measuring adapter into the smart card reader
and the smart card into the measuring adapter.
There had to be some modifications done to the card reader to get a
stronger signal. Since the reader had a plastic component over the chip, the
radiation was lower and we could not place the probe close enough to the chip.
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Figure 7.1: Measuring adapter
We decided to cut a part of the plastic component out to get the probe closer
to the chip of the smart card, see Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Measuring adapter with plastic part and with the part cut out
Initially, we were calculating DEMA after one set of measurements without
moving the probe. First of all, we found the position to do the measurements
at by measuring the area over the chip of the smart card and placing the probe
above the place where the radiation was highest. We calculated DEMA for a
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different number of measurements.
After that, we started measuring the signal and calculating DEMA in dif-
ferent positions. It turned out that the best spot for guessing the cipher key
correctly is not the spot with the highest signal. We calculated DEMA again
using a different number of measurements in the place where we were able to
guess the highest number of the key bytes correctly. Results presented in this
chapter are the results from the spot with the highest number of the correctly
guessed bytes of the key, not from the place with the highest signal.
We tested the program for 50, 200, 300, 400, 600 and 800 measurements.
We did each number of measurements for ten times except for 50 measure-
ments. Figure 7.3 shows the number of correctly guessed bytes of the cipher
key. For 200 measurements, the best run guessed 10 bytes of the key correctly;
the worst one guessed only 2 bytes correctly. For 300 measurements, always
at least half of the bytes was guessed correctly, but none of the runs guessed
the whole key correctly. The first time the entire cipher key was guessed
correctly was for 400 measurements. 600 and 800 measurements had 100%
success guessing the key.
Figure 7.3: Number of correctly guessed bytes of the cipher key
Figure 7.4 shows success in guessing each byte. It shows how many times
in ten measurements was the exact byte of the cipher key guessed correctly.
We can see that for 200 measurements some of the byes were never guessed
correctly, while some of them were guessed for 7 or 8 times. However, there
cannot be seen much relation between the position of the byte in the cipher
key and number of correct guesses. For example, byte number 14 was never
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guessed correctly for 200 measurements, but it was always guessed correctly
for the rest of the measurements, whereas byte number 1 was guessed the
same amount of times for 200 and 300 measurements.
Figure 7.4: Correctly guessed byte of the cipher key
The third graph 7.5 shows the position of the correct cipher key in the
correlation matrix. It shows the first measurement for each number of meas-
urements. Tables for all ten measurements of each number of measurement
can be found in Appendix B. We can see that for 200 measurements the
position can be high and the correct key can be almost the last one. For
300 measurements, all the positions can be found in the first hundred of the
highest calculated correlations. For 400 measurements the positions are in the
top ten highest calculated correlations. For 600 and 800 measurements the
cipher key was always guessed correctly, and the position is always the first.
Figure 7.6 shows the position of the correct cipher key in the correlation
matrix for each byte. It is obvious that for 50 measurements the position of the
correct cipher key is mostly in the second half of the correlation matrix, for 200
measurements it is mostly in the first half, and for 300 and more measurements
it is almost always in the first position of the correlation matrix.
50
7.1. DEMA
Figure 7.5: Position of the correct cipher key in the correlation matrix for
each individual measurement
Figure 7.6: Position of the correct cipher key in the correlation matrix for
each byte of the key
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7.2 2D Positioning
Firstly, we focused on measuring electromagnetic emissions in different posi-
tions and calculating the absolute mean value of the emissions. Secondly, we
calculated DEMA in each position and counted the number of correctly cal-
culated bytes and positions of the correct cipher key bytes in the correlation
matrices.
We conducted measurements over the smart card’s chip. Numbers at the
graphs labels are millimetres from the homing position of the positioning
device. They depend on the location of the smart card within the position-
ing device. We had the smart card at one place for all of the measurements.
These numbers are the borders of the chip on the smart card. We did most
of the measurements at positions 43-51 at the X-axis and 35-45 at the Y-axis,
which are the dimensions of the smart card’s chip. The coordinates mapping
to the smart card’s chip can be seen in Figure 7.7. We did not cover the whole
chip; however, we covered a small area near the chip, because the signal was
stronger on one side than on the other.
Figure 7.7: Mapping coordinates to smart card’s chip (coordinates is milli-
meters
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Firstly, we moved with the probe only in two-dimensional space. We can
see different mean values of the emissions in Figure 7.8. This graph shows the
intensity of the signal over the chip of the smart card. As we can see, there are
two main spots with the highest signal around the centre of the chip. We took
the measurements in each millimetre of the chip. The graph covers an area
of 12 mm × 13 mm. This measurement was done in a larger space and with
only one-millimetre gaps, because we wanted to see how the intensity of the
signal varies. It is evident from the graph that the intensity at the borders of
the chip is much lower than the radiation intensity in the middle of the chip.
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Figure 7.8: Graph of signal intensitity in 2D area
After that, we did measurements again with calculating DEMA and know-
ing the correct cipher key. This time, we did measurements every two mil-
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limetres, computed DEMA in each position, calculated how many bytes of
the key were guessed correctly and estimated the positions of the bytes of the
correct cipher key in the correlation matrices. We tried different number of
measurements; we started with 200, then 400 and 800.
As we can see in Figure 7.9, we barely guessed any bytes of the key for
200 measurements. We can see some correlation between the graph of the
mean values in Figure 7.8 and the number of correctly calculated bytes in
Figure 7.9. However, we guessed the highest number of the bytes correctly in
the position [49,41] and the second highest at the position [49,39], while the
strongest signal was at the positions [46-47,41] and [46-47,38]. The strongest
radiation did not mean the highest number of the correctly guessed bytes.
Out[182]=
43 45 47 49 51
35
37
39
41
43
45
0
1
2
3
Figure 7.9: Number of correctly calculated bytes of the correct cipher key, 200
measurements
For 400 measurements, the results are better as can be seen in Figure 7.10.
In spite of that, there is still no place where it is possible to guess the whole
key correctly. The highest number of the correctly guessed bytes of the key is
ten. It is in the same position as the highest number for 200 measurements.
The second highest number of the correctly guessed bytes corresponds to the
position in the graph for 200 measurements 7.9. As previously observed, this
measurement also confirms that the strongest signal does not mean the highest
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number of correctly guessed bytes of the cipher key.
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Figure 7.10: Number of correctly calculated bytes of the correct cipher key,
400 measurements
Then we did 800 measurements in each position. We managed to find
three places where it was possible to guess the whole key correctly. The
number of bytes guessed correctly can be seen in Figure 7.11. The most
successful positions correspond with the most successful positions for 200 and
400 measurements. Here we can see that the best positions are in the middle
of the Y-axis and on the right side of the X-axis.
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Figure 7.11: Number of correctly calculated bytes of the correct cipher key,
800 measurements
All of the measurements show that the best spot to attack does not have
to be the spot with the strongest signal. It means that graphs based only on
the mean of the signal measured at that area are not necessarily helpful while
searching for the best spot to attack. In all of the measurements, the signal
at the best attacking position was average or even below average.
We can see in Figure 7.9, Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 that the best spot
to attack is the position at the coordinates [41,49]. We can see the place at
the chip when we map it to the smart card in Figure 7.12
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Figure 7.12: Coordinates of the best spot to attack
When we compare success in guessing the key bytes in two-dimensional
space to the success in calculating DEMA in one position, it is obvious that
the results are better when we calculate DEMA without changing positions.
The reason is that the range of the data the oscilloscope sends to the computer
is the same range that we can see at the oscilloscope’s display. We did not
implement adjusting the amplitude of the signal to the intensity of the signal,
because we wanted to calculate mean of the signal intensity and the mean
diverse from different display adjustment. Therefore the results of the DEMA
are not as good as in the first part of testing.
Finally, we counted position of the correct cipher key in the correlation
matrix. We can see the results in graphs for 200 measurements (Figure 7.13),
400 measurements (Figure 7.14) and 800 measurement (Figure 7.15). The
number represents positions of the key bytes in correlation matrix in total.
For instance, when all the bytes of the key are guessed correctly, the total
number is 16, but when one byte is in the second position and the others are
in the first position, the total number is 17. The less the total number is, the
better the results are. The highest position of a byte is 256 because we are
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guessing bytes and a byte can only have 28 different values.
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Figure 7.13: Sum of positions of all correct key bytes in lists sorted by the
correlation coefficient, 200 measurements
In the graph for 200 measurements (Figure 7.13), the lowest total number
of positions was 762 in the position [49,39], which leads to an average position
47.6 in the correlation matrix. The second lowest number is 913 in the position
[49,41] which is the position about 56 on average in the correlation matrix.
We can see that the lowest number does not need to fully correspond to the
highest number of correctly guessed bytes. Even though the average position
in coordinates [49,39] was lower, the number of bytes guessed in coordinates
[49,41] was higher. In all coordinates the positions in the correlation matrices
are high and it is evident that we need more measurements to be able to at-
tack the smart card.
The results in the graph for 400 measurements (Figure 7.14) are much
better than the results for 200 measurements. The two lowest total numbers
of positions are at the same coordinates as for the 200 measurements. At
the coordinates [49,39] the total number is 107 and at the coordinates [49,41]
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is 240. The second lowest number is more than a double of the first lowest
number, even though at the coordinates [49,41] ten bytes of the cipher key
were guessed correctly and at the coordinates [49,39] nine bytes were guessed
correctly. The third lowest number was 550 at the coordinates [51,41], where
6 bytes were guessed correctly. The fourth one was [47,39], where 3 bytes were
guessed correctly. Except for the first two positions, the total number of the
positions corresponds to the number of correctly guessed bytes of the cipher
key.
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Figure 7.14: Sum of positions of all correct key bytes in lists sorted by the
correlation coefficient, 400 measurements
The best results are for 800 measurements (Figure 7.15). From this graph
it is obvious that the middle part of the Y-axis yields the best results. We
have three best positions where we guessed all the bytes correctly: [49,39],
[49,41] and [51,41]. All the results in the Y coordinate 41 and 39 were low.
Taking the whole chip, there are still places that are hard to attack even for
800 measurements, the worst position is [45,37] with total number 2089, even
though this position is close to the centre of the chip.
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Figure 7.15: Sum of positions of all correct key bytes in lists sorted by the
correlation coefficient, 800 measurements
7.3 3D Positioning
We did a similar kind of measurements in three-dimensional space as in the
two-dimensional space. We measured mean of the signal in different positions.
This time, we measured each millimetre. We covered the area above the chip.
The size of the measured area was 10 mm x 12 mm x 6 mm. The mean of the
values did not differ much, the difference was only around 5 %. We can see the
measured intensity of the radiation in Figure 7.16. There are two major places
with the highest intensity. The places are in the coordinate Z=1, coordinates
X and Y are [45-47, 41-42] and [45-47, 38-39]. The strongest signal was at the
coordinates [46,39]. These position are around the centre of the chip. We can
see that the rest of the signal has the similar intensity and it does not matter
what the Z coordinate is.
We did 40 measurements in each position. We could guess at most three
bytes of the key correctly. We calculated the least bytes of the cipher key
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correctly at the first layer, which could appear strange. We calculated only
one byte correctly in three positions and the positions were at the borders of
the chip. In the second layer we calculated one byte correctly at six positions
and two bytes correctly at two positions. Since we only conducted 40 measure-
ments in each position, the correctly guessed bytes can be only a coincidence
and does not have to mean that if we put the probe higher, we will get better
results.
For estimating the best spot for guessing the most bytes, we would have
to do more measurements in each position. We did not do it in this thesis,
because this mapping requires a lot of time. In three-dimensional space we
have to decide what the best spot for an attack is based on the mean of the
radiation intensity.
Figure 7.16: Graph of signal intensity in three-dimensional space
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Conclusion
The primary purpose of this thesis was to build a three-dimensional near-field
acquisition system, basically to create a positioning device that can position
a probe or an antenna in different locations in three-dimensional space. An-
other goal was to design and to implement a program that can communicate
with the built positioning device, a measuring equipment (oscilloscope) and a
smart card. The next part was implementing a program in C++ for calculat-
ing DEMA using the measured data. The testing part consists of measuring
electromagnetic radiation in various locations of a smart card’s chip. After
measuring the emissions, the acquired data are analysed and the best spot
for an attack is found. The last goal was to make graphs using measured
electromagnetic emissions and differential electromagnetic analysis results.
We managed to accomplish all the aims of this thesis. To achieve them,
we built a positioning device using 3D printing technology. We connected
a Minitronics board to the stepper engines and programmed it. We printed
holders for the probes that we used for measuring electromagnetic radiation.
We attached a smart card reader to the positioning device’s bed. We also
fastened the probe’s holders to the positioning device. After that, we ex-
ecuted measurements in one place, in two-dimensional and three-dimensional
space. We analysed the results and made graphs out of them. Firstly, we
computed DEMA in one spot only; we discovered that we needed at least
400 measurements to guess the whole cipher key correctly. Then we con-
tinued with two-dimensional and three-dimensional mapping. We found two
locations with the highest mean values of the electromagnetic radiation. We
discovered that the spots with the strongest electromagnetic radiation are not
necessarily the places where we can guess the most bytes of the cipher key
correctly. The signal at the locations with the most successful DEMA was av-
erage and sometimes even below average. We mapped the three-dimensional
space around the chip; it is evident that radiation right above the chip is
stronger than the radiation further from the chip.
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In the future, we can use three-dimensional acquisition system for mapping
signal radiating from other devices, e.g. an FPGA. We can use this device to
get the best positions for an attack. The positioning device controlled by the
implemented program can analyse the measured data automatically, and the
measurements are repeatable. The results can be later used for making these
devices more secure against electromagnetic side-channel attacks.
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AppendixA
AES
As we wrote in section 1.2, AES is a symmetric block cipher. The key length
can vary, it can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. The cipher uses the Rijndael algorithm.
Firstly, a key expansion is conducted, then a loop is executed. The loop is
executed for each round of each subkey. First of all, in each iteration, there
is a byte substitution, then bytes are shifted, and columns are mixed. At the
end of each iteration, the round key is added. After the end of the loop, there
is one more byte transformation, rows shift and adding round key, but there
is no more column combination.
A.1 Definitions
• Nc . . . Number of columns (32-bit words)
• Nw . . . Number of 32-bit words compromising cipher key
• K . . . Key
• Nr . . . Number of rounds
• round . . . one iteration of the cycle of the cipher
• state array . . . array representation of intermediate Cipher results
• word . . . group of 32-bits
• plaintext . . . cipher’s input
• ciphertext . . . cipher’s output
Nk and Nr change according to the key length.
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Figure A.1: AES
AES operations are internally executed on 2D fields. At the beginning of
encryption or decryption, the input is copied to a state array and operations
are executed on this array, then the array is copied to the output.
A.2 Key Expansion Algorithm
Key expansion uses the Rijndael algorithm. It takes cipher key K, and Key
Expansion is executed to generate a Key Schedule. The algorithm needs Nr
words, and each round needs Nb words of the key. In total algorithm generates:
Nb(Nr + 1) (A.1)
words. Final key schedule consists of linear array of four bytes words [Wi],
where
0 ≤ i < Nb(Nr + 1). (A.2)
First Nk words are filled with the cipher key. After that, each word is
equal to XOR of the previous word and a word that is Nk position before the
current word. For words that are multiples of Nk, XOR with round constant
Rcon[i] and transformation of the previous word is executed before.
A.2.1 Substitute words
This function is used to substitute bytes of the input. It takes four bytes and
each byte is substituted using S-Box, see Table A.1.
A.2.2 Rotate Word
This function does cyclic permutation of four bytes word.
Input : [a0, a1, a2, a3]
Output : [a1, a2, a3, a0]
70
A.3. Round
A.2.3 Pseudocode
Algorithm 1 Key Expansion
1: procedure KeyExpansion(byte key[4 ∗ Nk], word w[Nb ∗(Nr+1)], Nk)
2: word tmp
3: for i = 0 to Nk − 1 do
4: w[i]← word(key[4 ∗ i], key[4 ∗ i+ 1], key[4 ∗ i+ 2], key[4 ∗ i+ 3])
end for
5: for i = Nk to Nb(Nr + 1)− 1 do
6: tmp← w[i− 1]
7: if i mod Nk == 0 then
8: tmp← SubWord(RotWord(tmp))⊕Rcon[i/Nk]
9: else if Nk > 6 && i mod Nk == 4 then
10: tmp← SubWord(tmp)
11: w[i]← w[i−Nk]⊕ tmp
12: i+ = 1
end for
A.3 Round
At the beginning of each round, the input is filled from left to right and
from top to bottom by columns to 4×4 bytes matrix A. Then substitution is
applied to each byte of the matrix A. Substitution is described in Table A.1.
After that, there is operation ShiftRows, where lines of matrix A are cyclically
shifted gradually over 0 to 3 bytes to the left. The first row is shifted over 0
bytes, second over 1 byte, third over 2 bytes and the fourth one over 3 bytes,
this leads to byte transposition on bytes level. Operation MixColumns is then
applied; it is a substitution of 32 bits to 32 bits, so each output bit is a linear
combination of input bits. Finally new round key is added and operations
SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey are repeated according
to the number of rounds. In the last round the operation MixColumns is not
applied.
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A.3.1 Pseudocode
Algorithm 2 AES
1: procedure Cipher(byte in[4 ∗ Nk], byte out[4 ∗ Nb], word w[Nb
∗(Nr+1)])
2: ByteA[4, Nb]← matrixfortemporaryresults
3: A← in
4: AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1]
5: for round = 1 to round = Nr do
6: SubBytes(state)
7: ShiftRows(state)
8: if round 6= Nr then MixColumns(state)
9: AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1])
10: end for
11: return state
A.3.2 Add Round key
Each round key consists of Nb words that are created during key expansion.
At the beginning before the first round, there is an initial function, where the
first four round keys are XORed to plaintext (128 bits on 128 bits).
A.3.3 Word substitution
This function takes four bytes and applies S-Box (Table A.1) to each byte.
S-Box is constructed using a calculation of inverse multiplicative element of
each byte in finite field GF(28) with the irreducible polynomial
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1. (A.3)
Neutral element (the element that is transformed to itself) is 00, after that an
affine transformation is applied, where
bi = b(i+4) mod 8⊕ b(i+5) mod 8 . . .⊕ b(i+7) mod 8⊕ ci (A.4)
ci = i− t7 = 0. bit from byte c, where c=63 (A.5)
S-Box is represented with hexadecimal numbers in the substitution table
(Table A.1).
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Table A.1: SBox
A.3.4 Shift Rows
Bytes in the last three rows of the State table are cyclically shifted by a given
number of bytes (offset).
S′r,c = Sr,(c+shift(r,Nb))modNb for 0 < r < 4 and 0 ≤ c ≤ Nb
Figure A.2: Shift Rows
A.3.5 MixColumns
Function is applied column by column; it takes each column as a four-element
polynomial. Columns are considered to be polynomials over a finite field
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GF(28) and multiplied by a fixed polynomial a(x) modulo x4 + 1.
a(x) = 03x3 + 01x2 + 01x+ 02 (A.6)
S′(x) = a(x)⊗ S(x) (A.7)
S′0,c = (02 • S0,c)⊕ (03 • S1,c)⊕ S2,c ⊕ S3,c
S′1,c = S0,c ⊕ (02 • S1,c)⊕ (03 • S2,c)⊕ S3,c
S′2,c = S0,c ⊕ S1,c ⊕ (02 • S2,c)⊕ (03 • S3,c)
S′3,c = (03 • S0,c)⊕ S1,c ⊕ S2,c ⊕ (02 • S3,c)
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AppendixB
Positions of the Correct Key in
the Correlation Matrices
Table B.1 shows position in the correlation matrix of the correct cipher key
for 200 measurements. Table B.2 shows the results for 300 measurements and
Table B.3 shows the results for 400 measurements.
Table B.1: Position in the correlation matrix of the correct key of each byte
of cipher for each run for 200 measurements
75
B. Positions of the Correct Key in the Correlation Matrices
Table B.2: Position in the correlation matrix of the correct key of each byte
of cipher for each run for 300 measurements
Table B.3: Position in the correlation matrix of the correct key of each byte
of cipher for each run for 400 measurements
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AppendixC
Acronyms
ADS Analog-to-Digital Converter
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
ASM Assembler Source Language
CEMA Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis
CPA Correlation Power Analysis
CNC Computer Numeric Control
DEMA Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
EMSEC Emission Security
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LAN Local Area Network
RFID Radio-frequency identification
ROM Read-Only Memory
77
C. Acronyms
SCPI Standard Commands for Programmable Instruments
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SPA Simple Power Analysis
STL Standard Template Library/Stereolithography
USB Universal Serial Bus
VISA Virtual Instrument Software Architecture
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AppendixD
Contents of enclosed CD
readme.txt ....................... the file with CD contents description
src.......................................the directory of source codes
impl......................the directory of the implemented program
documentation ..... the directory of documentation of the sources
program......the directory of sources of the implemented program
thesis..............the directory of LATEX source codes of the thesis
Marlin-RC ...................... the Marlin firmware for Minitronics
AES ....................... the AES implementation for a smart card
graphs ................................. the directory of created graphs
data..................the directory of the source data for the graphs
graphs.nb......................................the file with graphs
text..........................................the thesis text directory
thesis.pdf...........................the thesis text in PDF format
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